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Although the cognitive theory has implicated judgment bias in various
psychopathologies, its role in decision making under risk remains relatively unexplored.
In the present study, we assessed the effects of cognitive judgment bias on risky
choices in rats. First, we trained and tested the animals on the rat version of the
probability-discounting (PD) task. During discrete trials, the rats chose between two
levers; a press on the “small/certain” lever always resulted in the delivery of one reward
pellet, whereas a press on the “large/risky” lever resulted in the delivery of four pellets.
However, the probability of receiving a reward from the “large/risky” lever gradually
decreased over the four trial blocks. Subsequently, the rats were re-trained and
evaluated on a series of ambiguous-cue interpretation (ACI) tests, which permitted their
classification according to the display of “optimistic” or “pessimistic” traits. Because
dopamine (DA) has been implicated in both: risky choices and optimism, in the last
experiment, we compared the reactivity of the dopaminergic system in the “optimistic”
and “pessimistic” animals using the apomorphine (APO; 2 mg/kg s.c.) sensitivity
test. We demonstrated that as risk increased, the proportion of risky lever choices
decreased significantly slower in “optimists” compared with “pessimists” and that these
differences between the two groups of rats were associated with different levels of
dopaminergic system reactivity. Our findings suggest that cognitive judgment bias,
risky decision-making and DA are linked, and they provide a foundation for further
investigation of the behavioral traits and cognitive processes that influence risky choices
in animal models.
Keywords: rat, probability discounting, ambiguous-cue interpretation, risk, pessimism, optimism, cognitive
judgment bias, dopamine
INTRODUCTION
Since Chevelier de Mere (1607–1684) asked Blaise Pascal for help with identifying a mathematical
answer for why he consistently lost money playing a certain game of dice, intellectuals, economists
and psychologists have studied how different aspects of human cognition influence risk-related
decision making. Recently, cognitive biases and distortions, such as unrealistic optimism
and/or pessimism, have been proposed to play crucial roles in risky decision making and
to cause the establishment and maintenance of mental disorders such as pathological gambling.
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The scientific definitions of optimism and pessimism focus
on expectations for the future (Carver and Scheier, 2014). An
individual who expects eventual success is considered optimistic,
whereas an individual who expects failure is considered
pessimistic (Carver and Scheier, 2014). The rather simple
difference between anticipating good vs. anticipating bad is
linked to core processes that underlie behavior. Optimistic and
pessimistic people differ in how they confront problems and
in how well they cope with adversity, and these differences
substantially impact their lives. The psychological literature
has provided a growing body of evidence that optimism
is a highly advantageous trait that is linked to enhanced
performance in the domains of academics (Chang and Bridewell,
1998; Montgomery et al., 2003), athletics (Gould et al., 2002;
Gordon, 2008), health (Scheier and Carver, 1987; Brydon et al.,
2009) and work (Seligman and Schulman, 1986; Kluemper
et al., 2009). Optimists have also been shown to engage
more in treatment programs (e.g., psychotherapy, nutrition
and education), and consistent with their greater engagement
in other high-priority tasks (Geers et al., 2009; Carver and
Scheier, 2014), optimistic individuals are known to work harder
at maintaining their relationships (Segerstrom, 2007; Rand,
2009).
Although the benefits of optimism are clear, over-optimistic
expectations can sometimes have negative consequences and
lead to poor performance. In certain situations, optimism
has been hypothesized to be detrimental (Weinstein, 1982,
1987; Tennen and Affleck, 1987; Weinstein et al., 2005).
For example, risky behavior may be more common among
optimists than among pessimists, and optimism may diminish
the likelihood that an individual will take preventive steps to
avoid an adverse outcome. In fact, several studies have revealed
that optimistic individuals tend to underestimate potential
obstacles and threats, to take risks, and to persist in investing
in hopeless endeavors (Felton et al., 2003; Trevelyan, 2008;
Hmieleski and Baron, 2009). Optimists are also more likely
than pessimists to take risks and continue gambling after losing
money (Gibson and Sanbonmatsu, 2004). Despite these reports,
information about the relationship between optimism and risky
decision making is still scarce and thus requires a systematic
investigation.
In the present study, we used two recently developed
animal paradigms, the probability discounting (PD) test and the
ambiguous-cue interpretation (ACI) test, to evaluate differences
in the approach to risk-taking between animals displaying
‘‘optimistic’’ and ‘‘pessimistic’’ traits. Because the dopamine
(DA) system is thought to play an important modulatory role
in both: risky choices and optimism (St Onge and Floresco,
2009; Sharot et al., 2012), we also evaluated the reactivity of the
DA system in individual animals using the apomorphine (APO)
sensitivity test.
To establish individual differences in risky decision making,
we initially trained and tested the rats on the operant version
of the PD task (St Onge and Floresco, 2009). In this behavioral
paradigm, over discrete trials, animals choose between two
levers; a press on the ‘‘certain/small’’ lever always results in
the delivery of one reward pellet, whereas a press on the
‘‘risky/large’’ lever results in the delivery of four pellets. However,
the probability of receiving a reward from the ‘‘large/risky’’
lever decreases across the four trial blocks (100, 50, 25 and
12.5%). The lever press response pattern across the four blocks
is used as an indicator of the rat’s attitude towards risk;
a choice bias towards the larger, probabilistic reward indicates
risk seeking, while a preference for the small/certain reward
indicates risk aversion (Floresco et al., 2008; St Onge and
Floresco, 2009).
To determine each rat’s individual level of
‘‘optimism’’/‘‘pessimism’’, we subjected the animals to a
number of consecutive ACI tests (Harding et al., 2004; Enkel
et al., 2010; Rygula et al., 2012) that were conducted at 1-week
intervals. In the ACI paradigm, rats are trained to press a lever in
an operant conditioning chamber to receive a food reward when
they hear a specific tone and to press another lever in response
to a different tone to avoid punishment by an electrical foot
shock. The tones, which serve as discriminative stimuli, acquire
positive and negative valence, and the training continues until
the rats demonstrate stable, correct discrimination. After the
animals attain stable discrimination performance, they are then
tested. The ambiguous-cue testing consists of a discrimination
task, as described above, but with the presentation of additional
tones with intermediate frequencies that are between the
positive and negative tones. The lever press response pattern
to the ambiguous cues is considered an indicator of the rat’s
expectation of a positive or negative event; in other words, it
is a measure of ‘‘optimism’’ or ‘‘pessimism’’, respectively (for
details, see Enkel et al., 2010; Rygula et al., 2012, 2013; Papciak
et al., 2013). Based on the results of this cognitive bias screening
(CBS), we classified individual animals into one of two groups:
those displaying a positive judgment bias, which were referred to
as ‘‘optimistic’’, and those displaying a negative judgment bias,
which were referred to as ‘‘pessimistic’’.
To evaluate the reactivity of the DA system in individual
animals the rats were subjected to the APO sensitivity test. In
this test, rats injected with the DA receptor agonist APO display
different types of stereotyped oral behavior (e.g., gnawing, licking
and sniffing) that indicate different degrees of DA system
stimulation. Stereotyped sniffing behavior changes to licking
behavior and finally to gnawing behavior with increasing DA
system reactivity.
We hypothesized that ‘‘optimism’’ and ‘‘pessimism’’ would be
associated with differences in the willingness to take a risk in the
PD task and predicted that these differences would be correlated
with the reactivity of the DA system in individual animals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
All experiments were conducted in accordance with the
European Union guidelines for the care and use of laboratory
animals (2010/63/EU) and were reviewed and approved by the
local Bioethics Committee. The authors attest that all efforts
were made to minimize the number of animals used and their
suffering.
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Subjects and Housing
We used 40 male Sprague Dawley rats (Charles River, Germany),
weighing between 175 and 200 g upon arrival. We housed the
rats in groups (4 animals/cage) in a temperature (21 ± 1◦C)
and humidity (40–50%) controlled room. The rats were kept
under a 12/12-h light/dark (L/D) cycle (lights on at 07:00 h). The
animals weremildly food restricted to approximately 85% of their
free-feeding weights what was achieved by providing 15–20 g
of food per rat per day (standard laboratory chow, Labofeed,
Kcynia, Poland). Food was restricted beginning at 1 week prior to
training. Water was freely available, with the exception of during
the test sessions. All the behavioral procedures were performed
during the light phase of the L/D cycle.
Apparatus
The operant tests were performed in 16 computer-controlled
boxes for operant-conditioning (Med Associates, St Albans,
VT, USA); each box was equipped with a speaker, a light, a
liquid dispenser (set to deliver 0.1 ml of 5% sucrose solution
(ACI task), a pellet dispenser (set to deliver 45 mg pellets;
Bioserv, Frenchtown, NJ, USA (PD task)), a grid floor through
which scrambled electrical shocks (0.5 mA (ACI task)) could
be delivered, and two retractable levers. The levers were
located on opposite sides of the feeder. All of the behavioral
protocols, including the data acquisition and recordings, were
programmed in Med State notation code (Med Associates).
The experimental procedures for the PD test were modified
from the procedures described by St Onge and Floresco (2009).
The experimental procedures for the ACI test used in this
study were performed according to Enkel et al. (2010) with
modifications, and they have been described in detail elsewhere
(Rygula et al., 2012, 2015).
Behavioral Training and Testing in the
Probability Discounting Task
The training and testing protocols used have been previously
described elsewhere (Floresco et al., 2008; St Onge and Floresco,
2009). Briefly, the rats were first trained to press both levers
under a fixed-ratio schedule (1:1) to a criterion of 60 presses in
30 min. Half of the animals were trained first on the left lever
and later on the right lever, and the other half were trained
in the reverse order. Subsequently, we trained the rats on a
simplified version of the full task. Each training session began
in darkness, with the levers retracted. Each trial began with the
illumination of the house lights and extension of one of the
two levers into the operant box. If the animal responded within
10 s, the lever retracted and a single sucrose pellet (45 mg, Bio-
Serv, Frenchtown, NJ, USA) was delivered with 50% probability.
If the animal did not respond to the lever within 10 s, the
lever retracted, the house light was switched off, and the trial
was scored as an omission. The trials lasted 40 s each and the
training session consisted of 90 trials. We used this procedure to
familiarize the animals with the probabilistic nature of the full
task. The training took approximately 4–5 days (to a criterion of
80 or more successful trials).
During PD testing, the rats received daily sessions of 72 trials
that were separated into four blocks of 18 trials. The entire
session took 48 min to complete, and the animals were trained
5 days per week. At the beginning of each session the levers
were retracted and the house light was switched off (the intertrial
state). Each trial began with the illumination of the house light
and extension of one or both levers (the schedule of a single
trial is shown in Figure 1B). One lever was designated as the
small/certain lever and the other was designated as the large/risky
lever; these designations were counterbalanced left/right and
remained consistent throughout the training phase. When a
lever was chosen, both levers were retracted. Selection of the
small/certain lever always resulted in the delivery of one sucrose
pellet; however, selection of the large/risky lever resulted in
the delivery of four sucrose pellets with a particular probability
(see below). Multiple sucrose pellets were delivered 0.5 s apart.
If the animal failed to press a lever within 10 s, the operant
conditioning box was reset to the intertrial state until the next
trial and scored as an omission. Each of the four blocks began
with eight forced choice one-lever trials (four trials randomized
in pairs for each lever), which allowed the animals to learn
the probability of receiving reinforcement during each block
and the amount of food associated with each lever press. Next,
there were 10 free-choice 2 lever trials, and the rats chose
either the large/risky or the small/certain lever. The probability
of obtaining four sucrose pellets after pressing the large/risky
lever successively decreased across the blocks; the probabilities
averaged 100% in block 1, 50% in block 2, 25% in block 3,
and 12.5% in block 4. For each session and trial block, the
probability of receiving the large reward was drawn from a
set probability distribution. Therefore, on any given day, the
probabilities in each block could vary, but on average across
many training days, the actual probability experienced by the rat
approximated the set value. Using these probabilities, selection
of the large/risky lever was advantageous in the first two blocks,
balanced during the 25% block and disadvantageous in the
last block.
The rats were trained on the task until the following criteria
were met by the group: (1) In at least 80% of the trials they
chose the large/risky lever during the first trial block (100%
probability); (2) In less than 60% of the trials they chose the
large/risky lever during the final trial block (12.5% probability);
and (3) the consistent choice patterns fulfilling criteria 1 and
2 were demonstrated on three consecutive days. Individual
patterns of PD behavior over the three criterion days were used
to compare risk-taking behavior between the rats displaying
‘‘optimistic’’ and ‘‘pessimistic’’ traits.
Behavioral Parameters Measured in the
Probability Discounting Test
The primary dependentmeasure of interest was the proportion of
choices directed towards the large/risky lever during each block
of free-choice trials, taking into account trial omissions. For each
block, this proportion was calculated by dividing the number of
choices of the large/risky lever by the total number of successful
trials.
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FIGURE 1 | Graphical abstract of the study. (A,B) Schematics of the
probability discounting (PD) task. (C) Schematic of the cognitive bias
screening (CBS) procedure. To assess cognitive judgment bias as a trait, we
examined the animals in a series of 10 consecutive ambiguous-cue
interpretation (ACI) tests conducted at 1-week intervals. Based on the average
cognitive bias index obtained from these 10 ACI tests, the rats were divided
into 2 subgroups: “optimistic” and “pessimistic”. (D) Apomorphine (APO)
sensitivity test. After the animals were injected with APO (2 mg/kg), they were
placed into an open field for 1 h. All of the stereotyped behaviors displayed by
the animals (sniffing, licking, and gnawing), as well as their general locomotor
activity, were recorded. (E) Main results of the study.
Behavioral Training for the
Ambiguous-Cue Interpretation Test
After training and testing on the PD task, the rats were re-trained
and re-tested on the ACI paradigm. As mentioned previously,
the experimental training and testing procedures for the ACI
paradigm used in this study have been described previously
(Enkel et al., 2010; Rygula et al., 2012, 2015).
Briefly, the animals were initially trained to press one lever
when a ‘‘positive’’ tone (2000 Hz at 75 dB, counterbalanced)
signaled reward (20% sucrose solution) availability and to press a
second lever when another ‘‘negative’’ tone (9000 Hz at 75 dB,
counterbalanced) signaled a forthcoming punishment (electric
foot shock: 0.5 mA, 10-s). By pressing the appropriate levers, the
rats could either avoid the punishment or receive a reward. 10 s
intertrial intervals (ITIs) separated the tone presentations, and
training sessions lasted for 30 min. The rats had to reach the
criteria of at least 90% correct responses to the tone signaling
reward availability over three consecutive training sessions and
at least 60% correct punishment-prevention responses over
three consecutive training sessions to proceed to discrimination
training.
During the discrimination-training phase, the animals were
trained to discriminate between 20 negative and 20 positive
tones presented in pseudorandom order, by pressing the
appropriate levers (as learned in the previous training stage) to
maximize reward delivery and minimize punishment. Training
sessions lasted 40 min. The animals were required to do a
minimum of 70% correct responses for each lever over three
consecutive discrimination sessions to qualify for the ACI
testing.
Ambiguous-Cue Testing
During the ACI testing sessions, the rats were exposed to 20
positive, 20 negative and 10 ambiguous (5000 Hz at 75 dB) tone
presentations. Each test session lasted for 50 min. The tones
were played in a pseudo-randomized order and were separated
by 10-s ITIs. The responses to each tone (positive, ambiguous
and negative) presented during the ACI testing were analyzed
as a proportion of the overall number of responses to a given
tone. To calculate the cognitive bias index, we subtracted the
proportion of negative responses to the ambiguous cues from
the proportion of positive responses to the ambiguous cues,
resulting in values of between −1 and 1. Values of greater
than or equal to 0 indicated an overall positive judgment
and ‘‘optimistic’’ interpretation of the ambiguous cue, whereas
values of below 0 indicated an overall negative judgment and
‘‘pessimism’’.
Cognitive Bias Screening
The CBS has been described in detail in Rygula et al. (2013).
Briefly, to assess the ‘‘optimistic’’ and ‘‘pessimistic’’ traits, we
subjected the rats to a series of ten consecutive ACI tests,
conducted at 1-week intervals. Based on the average values of
cognitive bias index data obtained from these 10 ACI tests, the
animals were divided into two experimental groups: ‘‘optimistic’’
and ‘‘pessimistic’’.
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Apomorphine Sensitivity Test
The APO sensitivity test that was applied in our study
was modified from the procedures previously described by
Havemann et al. (1986) and Surmann and Havemann-Reinecke
(1995). Briefly, immediately after the animals were injected
with APO (2 mg/kg s.c.), they were placed in an open field
(66 × 56 × 30 cm) for 1 h. Next, scoring was performed in
30-s periods with 5-min intervals. Within each scoring period,
we recorded all of the stereotyped behaviors displayed by the
animals. Each 30-s scoring period was classified according to
the stereotyped behavior exhibited during the longest period
(e.g., when gnawing, licking and sniffing lasted for 20, 7
and 3 s, respectively, the scoring period was classified as
‘‘gnawing’’). When two stereotyped behaviors were displayed
for equal amounts of time (e.g., 15 s each), we scored
both behaviors. Stereotyped sniffing was defined as rhythmic
movement of the snout and head along the cage wall or floor,
accompanied by rapid vibrissae movements. Stereotyped licking
was characterized by protrusion of the tongue against the cage
floor or wall, and stereotyped gnawing was scored when the
animal gripped the cage wall or floor between its teeth. We also
scored stereotyped climbing, characterized by vertical scratching
and rhythmic, alternating movements of both forelegs on the
cage wall (Havemann et al., 1986).
Experimental Design
The experimental design and schematic representations of the
procedures are presented in Figures 1A–D. The animals that
met the criteria and successfully completed the training were
tested on the PD task three times over three consecutive days
and were then re-trained on the ACI task. Each animal was
subjected to the CBS procedure as previously described. After
the rats were evaluated to determine their degree of ‘‘optimism’’
or ‘‘pessimism’’, they were divided into ‘‘optimistic’’ and
‘‘pessimistic’’ experimental groups. To assess whether the traits
of ‘‘pessimism’’ and ‘‘optimism’’ interacted with risky behaviors,
we compared the average performances of the ‘‘optimistic’’ and
‘‘pessimistic’’ animals on the three PD tests.
Notably, the PD testing preceded the ACI testing because
the levers remained unbiased during the second test, only
if the tests were conducted in that order. If the animals
had been tested first on the ACI paradigm, then the levers
would have acquired negative and positive valences via their
associations with a punishment or palatable reward, and they
would not have been able to be used as reliable operands in the
PD paradigm.
Because DA has been implicated in both: risky choices and
optimism, in the final experiment, we compared the reactivity
of the DA system between the ‘‘optimistic’’ and ‘‘pessimistic’’
animals using the APO sensitivity test.
Statistics
The data were analyzed using SPSS (version 21.0, SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL, USA). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used
to assess the distribution of the cognitive bias index data.
Differences in PD between the ‘‘optimists’’ and ‘‘pessimists’’
were analyzed by 2-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), with
the cognitive bias index as a between-subject factor (2 levels:
‘‘optimism’’ and ‘‘pessimism’’) and the trial block as a within-
subject factor (4 levels: 100, 50, 25 and 12.5%).
The differences in the frequency of ‘‘optimism’’ and the speed
and distance traveled following APO administration between
the ‘‘optimists’’ and ‘‘pessimists’’ were analyzed using t-tests.
Differences in the processing of the positive and negative tones
and ambiguous cues between the ‘‘optimistic’’ and ‘‘pessimistic’’
animals were investigated by 4-way ANOVA, with cognitive bias
as the between-subject factor (2 levels: optimistic and pessimistic)
and lever (2 levels: positive and negative), tone (3 levels: positive,
ambiguous and negative) and test (10 levels: baseline test 1–10)
as the within-subjects factors.
Differences in the length of training for the ACI test
and insensitivity to the APO challenge (number of different
stereotyped behaviors) between the ‘‘optimists’’ and ‘‘pessimists’’
were analyzed separately using the Mann-Whitney test
because the data were not normally distributed. Finally, the
Spearman correlation coefficient between the cognitive bias
index and the frequency of gnawing was determined. For
pair-wise comparisons, the values were adjusted using Sidak’s
correction factor for multiple comparisons (Howell, 1997).
All of the tests of significance were performed at α = 0.05.
Homogeneity of variance was confirmed using a Levene’s
test. For repeated-measures analyses, sphericity was also
verified using Mauchly’s test. The data are presented as the
mean± SEM.
RESULTS
Probability Discounting
All of the trained animals reached the criteria for stable PD
as a group (defined as a selection of the large/risky lever
during the first trial block (100% probability) in at least 80%
of trials and selection of the large/risky lever during the last
trial block (12.5% probability) in less than 60% of trials,
maintained over three consecutive days) after 15 sessions. The
average proportion of risky lever choices made by all of the
rats in each block of free-choice trials during the 12 training
and three test sessions is presented in Figure 2. Repeated-
measures ANOVA of the average choice data from the three
PD tests revealed a significant main effect of trial block
(F(3,84) = 30.55, p ≤ 0.001). Post hoc multiple comparisons
revealed significant differences in the proportion of choices
of the large/risky lever between the 100% vs. 25%, 100%
vs. 12.5%, 50% vs. 12.5%, and 25% vs. 12.5% trial blocks
(p ≤ 0.001), as well as between the 50% vs. 25% trial blocks
(p ≤ 0.01).
Ambiguous-Cue Testing
To compare the risk-taking behaviors between the ‘‘optimistic’’
and ‘‘pessimistic’’ animals, after the PD testing, the rats
were trained for the ACI paradigm and on the basis of
the CBS procedure, classified as ‘‘optimistic’’ or ‘‘pessimistic’’.
Only 30 out of 40 trained rats, reached the criteria and
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FIGURE 2 | PD training and testing. The average proportion of times the
large/risky lever was selected across the four trial blocks (100, 50, 25 and
12.5%) during the training and test sessions.
qualified for the CBS. The animals that were further classified
as ‘‘optimistic’’ reached the criteria of the positive tone,
negative tone and discrimination training after 4.8 ± 0.3,
30.1 ± 5.7, and 60.1 ± 8.2 days, respectively, whereas those
classified as ‘‘pessimistic’’ reached the same criteria after
4.2 ± 0.17, 32.1 ± 3.7 and 49.7 ± 5.7 days, respectively.
The Mann-Whitney test revealed that the total length of
training did not significantly differ between the ‘‘pessimistic’’
and ‘‘optimistic’’ animals (medians = 74 and 94, respectively;
U = 83, NS).
The average cognitive bias index of all of the tested rats,
which was determined based on CBS, was 0.09 ± 0.06. The
cognitive bias index data collected during the CBS were normally
distributed (Z = 0.12, N = 30, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
Analysis of the animals’ responses to the negative and positive
levers following presentation of the reference and ambiguous
tones across the CBS indicated the absence of test-retest
effects. Despite the significant lever × test × tone interaction
(F(18,504) = 2.07, p < 0.01), post hoc pair-wise comparisons
revealed the absence of unequivocal patterns in between-test
differences.
“Optimistic” vs. “Pessimistic” Animals
The CBS results enabled the animals to be separated into two
groups, ‘‘pessimistic’’ (N = 20, average (AVG) cognitive bias
index <0) and ‘‘optimistic’’ (N = 10, AVG cognitive bias
index > 0), that differed significantly in their interpretation of
the ambiguous cues over time (Figure 3A). The ‘‘pessimistic’’
animals had an average cognitive bias index, ranging from−0.02
to −0.80, whereas the ‘‘optimists’’ displayed cognitive bias index
in the range from 0.00 to 0.48.
Further analysis revealed significant differences in the
response patterns of the ‘‘pessimistic’’ and ‘‘optimistic’’ groups
(there was a significant lever × tone × cognitive bias interaction
(F(2,56) = 14.40, p < 0.001)). In response to the ambiguous tone,
the ‘‘optimistic’’ animals responded significantly more often
(p < 0.001) to the positive lever (Figure 3B) and significantly
(p < 0.001) less often to the negative lever (Figure 3C) than
FIGURE 3 | “Optimistic” vs. “pessimistic” animals; results of the CBS.
(A) The mean ± SEM of the cognitive bias index of the animals classified
(based on 10 ACI tests) as “pessimistic” (filled bar, N = 20) vs. “optimistic”
(open bar, N = 10). A cognitive bias index of above 0 indicates an overall
positive judgment and “optimistic” interpretation of the ambiguous cue.
(B) The mean ± SEM proportions of positive, (C) Negative and (D) Omitted
responses to the trained and ambiguous tones in the “pessimistic” (filled
circles, N = 20) and “optimistic” (open circles, N = 10) rat groups. ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significant (p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively) differences between
the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” animals.
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their ‘‘pessimistic’’ counterparts. The ‘‘optimistic’’ animals also
responded significantly (p < 0.01) more often to the positive
lever in response to the reference positive tone (Figure 3B) and
significantly (p< 0.01) less often to the negative lever in response
to the reference negative tone (Figure 3C). Analysis of the trials
in which the animals did not respond (omissions) revealed a
significant cognitive bias × tone interaction (p = 0.018) and a
trend (p= 0.051, Sidak post hoc test) towards a higher proportion
of omitted trials in the ‘‘pessimistic’’ animals compared to
the ‘‘optimistic’’ animals following presentation of the positive
reference tone (Figure 3D).
Analysis of the ‘‘optimism’’ frequency (number of tests in
which the cognitive bias index of an individual animal was
greater than zero, out of the 10 CBS sessions) revealed that
on average, the rats classified as ‘‘pessimists’’ were significantly
(p < 0.001) less frequently ‘‘optimistic’’ than their ‘‘optimistic’’
conspecifics (t(28) = 8.09, Figures 4A,C).
As mentioned previously, although the cognitive judgment
bias index fluctuated in both groups of animals (there was a
significant lever × test × tone interaction (F(18,504) = 2.07,
p < 0.01)), the differences between the ‘‘pessimistic’’ and
‘‘optimistic’’ remained constant across the screening period
FIGURE 4 | Cognitive bias as a stable and long-lasting behavioral trait. Out of 40 trained rats, only 30 reached the criterion and qualified for the CBS.
(A) The mean ± SEM of the “optimism frequency” (number of ACI tests out of the 10 ACI tests that comprised the CBS that resulted in a cognitive bias index above
“0”) of the animals that were classified as “optimistic” (open bars, N = 10) and “pessimistic” (filled bars, N = 20). (B) The mean ± SEM of the cognitive bias index of
the animals that were classified as “optimistic” (open circles, N = 10) and “pessimistic” (filled circles, N = 20) across all 10 baseline ACI tests. (C) Histogram of the
“optimism” frequency in relation to the valence of the individual cognitive bias index (AVG from CBS) in all (N = 30) animals. ∗∗∗ Indicates a significant (p < 0.001)
difference between the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” animals.
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(there was no significant cognitive bias × test interaction;
F(9,252) = 1.38, NS), indicating that the traits were stable
(Figure 4B).
Interrelation Between Cognitive
Judgement Bias and Probability
Discounting
When the probability of reward was high (100%, 50%) or
intermediate (25%), the proportion of time that the large/risky
lever was chosen did not differ between the ‘‘optimists’’ and
‘‘pessimists’’ (Figure 5). However, compared to ‘‘pessimism’’,
‘‘optimism’’ was associated with a significantly (∗p≤ 0.05) higher
proportion of selection of the large/risky lever in the last block,
when the probability of receiving a reward was the lowest (12.5%,
Figure 5). Two-way repeated-measures ANOVA of the average
choice data from the 3 PD tests revealed a significant cognitive
bias× trial block interaction (F(3,84) = 3.53, p ≤ 0.05).
Interrelation Between Cognitive
Judgement Bias and Sensitivity to
Dopaminergic Stimulation in the
Apomorphine Test
After the administration of APO, the intensity of stereotyped
climbing (Mann-WhitneyU = 82) and licking behaviors (Mann-
Whitney U = 85) did not differ between the ‘‘optimists’’
and ‘‘pessimists’’; however, ‘‘optimism’’ was associated with
significantly (Mann-Whitney U = 62.5, p ≤ 0.05) more intense
gnawing behavior (Figure 6A) and a statistical trend (Mann-
Whitney U = 66.5, p = 0.088) towards less intense sniffing
(Figure 6A). Correlation analysis revealed that the cognitive
bias index was significantly positively correlated (r = 0.39,
N = 30, p < 0.05) with the frequency of stereotyped gnawing
(Figure 6B). We observed no significant differences in APO-
induced locomotor activity, as expressed by the speed of
locomotion or the distance traveled in the open field (t(28) = 0.93
and 0.91, respectively, NS, Figure 6C).
FIGURE 5 | PD in the “pessimistic” and “optimistic” rats. The average
proportion of times the large/risky lever was selected by the “optimistic”
(N = 10, open bars) and “pessimistic” (N = 20, filled bars) animals across the
four trial blocks (100, 50, 25 and 12.5%) of the three PD test sessions. The
“optimists” were significantly (*p < 0.05) more likely than the “pessimists” to
choose the large/risky lever when the probability of receiving a large reward
was the lowest (12.5%). The data are presented as the mean ± SEM.
FIGURE 6 | Stereotyped behaviors in the “optimistic” and “pessimistic”
animals following APO challenge. (A) The number (mean ± SEM) of
dominant stereotyped behaviors scored during 30-s scoring blocks
throughout a 1-h period after administration of 2 mg/kg APO to “optimistic”
(open bars, N = 10) and “pessimistic” (filled bars, N = 20) animals.
(B) The correlation between the cognitive bias index and APO-induced
stereotyped gnawing. (C) The AVG speed of movement (mm/s) and
distance (m) traveled in the open field by the animals classified as “optimistic”
(N = 10, open bars) and “pessimistic” (N = 20, filled bars) during a 1-h period
following APO (2 mg/kg s.c.) administration. The data are presented as the
mean ± SEM. ∗ Indicates a significant (p < 0.05) difference between the
“optimistic” and “pessimistic” animals. “a” Indicates statistically significant
trend (p = 0.088) towards difference between the “optimistic” and
”pessimistic” animals.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we used two recently developed
behavioral paradigms to investigate how ‘‘optimistic’’ and
‘‘pessimistic’’ traits determine animals’ approaches to risky
decision making. The results of our study demonstrated
that in rats, ‘‘optimistic’ judgment bias was associated
with an increased propensity to make a risky choice, but
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only when the level of risk was high and not when it was
low or intermediate. ‘Optimism’’ was also associated with
increased sensitivity of the DA system, as indicated by the
increase in stereotyped gnawing following APO challenge
(Figure 1E).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
systematically assess the effects of cognitive judgment bias
on risk-based decision making, and the results indicate that
‘‘optimistic’’ animals display more risky choices.
The interrelations between cognitive judgment bias and other
forms of decisionmaking and associated cognitive processes have
been previously studied in our laboratory. In a recent study,
we examined whether the traits of ‘‘optimism’’ and ‘‘pessimism’’
are associated with differences in the interpretation of gambling
outcomes in the rat slot machine task (Rafa et al., 2015). We
demonstrated that although the ‘‘pessimistic’’ and ‘‘optimistic’’
animals did not differ in their propensity to interpret the
‘‘clear win’’ (light pattern 3 × ON), ‘‘near miss’’ (light pattern
2 × ON) and ‘‘near loss’’ (light pattern 1 × ON) outcomes
as ‘‘win’’ trials, these animals differed significantly in their
interpretation of the ‘‘clear loss’’ (light pattern 3 × OFF)
outcome. The ‘‘pessimists’’ were significantly less likely than
the ‘‘optimists’’ to press the ‘‘collect’’ lever following the ‘‘clear
loss’’ outcome, suggesting that the ‘‘pessimists’’ interpreted
the clearly hopeless situation more negatively. The results of
the present study are consistent with these previous findings,
in which differences between ‘‘optimists’’ and ‘‘pessimists’’
appeared only in a ‘‘hopeless’’ situation, when the risk was
greater. The cognitive judgment bias appears to influence
animals’ decisions primarily in extreme situations. Because
the degree of ambiguity has been proposed to influence the
perception of likelihood or risk, one plausible explanation for
this phenomenon is that in the PD task used in our study, at
lower levels of risk, the ‘‘optimistic’’ and ‘‘pessimistic’’ animals
both recognized the probability and adjusted their decisions
accordingly. However, at the highest level of risk, the probability
was ambiguous, and the ‘‘optimists’’ adjusted their expectations
more positively than the ‘‘pessimists’’. A similar mechanism
could have also determined the choices of the animals in
the aforementioned study that compared the decision making
of ‘‘optimists’’ and ‘‘pessimists’’ in the rat slot machine task.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) have argued that when individuals
are given a probability that they believe is ambiguous, they
use the probability as an anchor and adjust it upwards or
downwards, and one important factor affecting this adjustment
is whether the individuals are pessimistic or optimistic about the
outcome.
In another study conducted recently in our laboratory
(Rygula et al., 2015), we have demonstrated that animals
displaying the ‘‘optimistic’’ trait are more motivated to obtain
a sweet sucrose reward than their ‘‘pessimistic’’ conspecifics.
These findings could provide another plausible explanation
for the effects observed in the present experiments. As the
expectancy-value theory posits that an individual’s expectations
of success and the subjective value that they place on
succeeding coincide with their motivation to perform different
achievement tasks (Wigfield and Eccles, 2000), the ‘‘optimistic’’
animals were probably more motivated to obtain a risky
reward than the ‘‘pessimistic’’ ones. Indeed, as postulated
by Carver and Scheier (2014), when confronting a challenge
(e.g., a high-risk situation), optimists are more persistent
and confident, whereas pessimists are more hesitant and
doubtful.
Finally, the differences between the ‘‘optimistic’’ and
‘‘pessimistic’’ animals could be attributed to differences in
their sensitivities to positive and negative feedback in the task.
For example, the ‘‘optimists’’ could have been more sensitive
to positive feedback (high reward) and/or less sensitive to
negative feedback (lack of reward), and these differences could
potentially be the most pronounced at the highest level of
risk, when the probability of obtaining a large reward is the
lowest. Further studies (e.g., using the probabilistic reversal
learning paradigm; Bari et al., 2010) should provide additional
insights into this issue by enabling detailed analysis of the
differences in sensitivity to true and misleading positive
and negative feedback in ‘‘optimistic’’ and ‘‘pessimistic’’
animals.
The present data also provided novel insights into the
interrelations among risk-based decision making, cognitive
judgment bias and the sensitivity of the DA system. The animals
classified as ‘‘optimistic’’ following APO challenge displayed
more stereotyped gnawing behavior than the ‘‘pessimists’’,
which suggests higher reactivity of the DA system in the
‘‘optimistic’’ animals. APO, which is a full agonist of D1
and D2 DA receptors and has similar intrinsic activity as
DA, is often used to study the reactivity of the dopaminergic
system (Havemann et al., 1986; Cools et al., 1993; Surmann
and Havemann-Reinecke, 1995; Germeyer et al., 2002). The
resulting stereotyped motility patterns are dose dependent; low
doses of APO induce sniffing behaviors, which then progress
to licking and gnawing behaviors with increasing doses. In
addition to dose dependency, Havemann et al. (1986) observed
individual differences in the stereotyped responses. An APO
dose of 2 mg/kg s.c. was found to result in at least two
different behavioral phenotypes in rats (Havemann et al.,
1986; Surmann and Havemann-Reinecke, 1995) with respect
to oral stereotyped behavior and locomotor activity. Some
rats exhibited stereotyped sniffing with markedly enhanced
locomotor activity, while others displayed stereotyped licking
and/or gnawing with only slightly enhanced locomotor activity.
Similar observations have been reported by Costall and Naylor
(1973), who have suggested that compared to sniffing or
locomotor activation, licking and gnawing are signs of a greater
degree of general DA activation in the central nervous system
after systemic administration of APO. In the same study, the
authors assigned a higher score for stereotyped licking or
gnawing than for stereotyped sniffing. In two strains of rats,
Cools et al. (1993) and Rots et al. (1996) showed a similar
pharmacological selection based on susceptibility to APO. As
reviewed by Ellenbroek and Cools (2002), APO susceptible
(gnawing) rats have increased levels of mRNA for tyrosine
hydroxylase in the nigrostriatal and the tuberoinfundibular
system, have increased levels of [125I] iodosulpiride binding
and of mRNA for D1 receptors in the neostriatum, and have
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lower levels of noradrenaline immunoreactivity in the nucleus
accumbens (NAc). As proposed by Joyce and Iversen (1984) and
Havemann et al. (1986), the individual differences in stereotyped
responses after administration of APO might be explained
either by an incompatibility hypothesis (incompatibility between
two patterns of behavior) or by competition between the
nigrostriatal and the mesolimbic DA systems, for motor output
pathways. Clearly, further studies, using microdialysis or in
vivo voltammetry will help to directly pinpoint dopaminergic
loci for the observed differences between ‘‘optimistic’’ and
‘‘pessimistic’’ animals.
Although interrelations among cognitive judgment bias, risk
taking and DA reactivity have been demonstrated for the first
time here, they are not surprising. DA is a key neuromodulator
in reward-learning and reward-seeking behaviors in humans
and nonhuman animals (Schultz, 2001; Wise, 2004; Belin and
Everitt, 2008), and it has been shown to play an important role in
behavioral guidance (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014) via value/action
learning (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005) and action invigoration
(Salamone et al., 1994; Parkinson et al., 2002; Satoh et al., 2003;
Niv et al., 2007), as well as in maintaining the balance between
different types of behavioral control (Hitchcott et al., 2007).
Indeed, DA neurotransmission in the ventral striatum has been
recently reported to refine cost–benefit evaluations that require
risk–reward judgments (Stopper et al., 2013). In Stopper’s study,
D1 receptor blockade caused risk aversion, while D1 stimulation
led to optimized decision making, suggesting that a normal level
of NAcD1 activitymodifies decision-making biases away from or
towards larger uncertain rewards tomaximize the overall amount
of reward that can be obtained. These effects were postulated
to be mediated partially by fluctuations in tonic DA in the
NAc, which appear to represent the integration of multiple types
of information relevant to decision making, including reward
uncertainty, opportunities to select preferred rewards, overt
choice behavior, and changes in reward availability (St. Onge
et al., 2012). However, in the same study, NAc D2 receptor
activity was not observed to make a discernible contribution to
these functions, whereas excessive D3 receptor activity blunted
the impacts of larger rewards on decision biases. Notably, drugs
that enhance dopaminergic function, such as L-DOPA, have
also been shown to enhance a signal in striatum that represents
reward-prediction errors during instrumental learning. Such
drugs, thus increase the likelihood that stimuli associated with
greater monetary gains will be chosen (Pessiglione et al., 2006),
enhance estimates of hedonic pleasure during the imaginative
construction of positive future life events (Sharot et al., 2009),
and enhance optimism bias by impairing the ability to refine
predictions in response to undesirable information about the
future, as demonstrated in a recent study by Sharot et al.
(2012).
Using an operant PD paradigm and multiple consecutive
ACI tests, we have demonstrated for the first time that
cognitive judgment bias is linked to risky decision making in
an animal model. Additionally, using the APO sensitivity test,
we attributed the observed differences between ‘‘optimists’’
and ‘‘pessimists’’, at least in part, to differences in the
reactivity of the DA system. Considering these results
together with those of the human studies and our previous
reports, it is apparent that ‘‘optimism’’ and ‘‘pessimism’’
exert powerful and differential effects on certain forms of
cost/benefit decision making. These findings may be useful
for studying cognitive deficits associated with psychiatric
disorders such as depression, mania or pathological
gambling.
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